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From:
The Modular Brain:
At
home I have a diagram taken from a children's encyclopedia from the 1930s. It's
labeled "The Central Control Station of Your Body," and shows a
cutaway view of a human head containing
tiny rooms, occupied by one or more men dressed up in business suits fashionable
at the time.
In one room, a man
is sitting at a desk talking into one of those two-piece
telephones, the earphone held in his hand and the mouthpiece sitting in front of
him on the desk. Written above this scene is the phrase, "Manager
of Speech." Toward the back of the brain, a small box houses a
man scanning pictures on a desk. He is the "Receiver of the Camera
Pictures," forwarded to him over “air tubes" from a room farthest to
the front containing four men dressed in sailor uniforms and pulling on rigs
and pulleys controlling the eye (they are identified as the "Camera
Operators"). At the center of the cutaway head is a room larger than any of the others and occupied by three men sitting at a conference table
(in line with the prevailing practices and prejudices of the time, only white
men are depicted in charge of the "control stations"). This caption
reads, "Brain Headquarters in the Cerebrum."
Altogether nine
tiny boxes filled with men carrying out various tasks illustrate the workings of
the brain. The caption for the diagram as a whole reads: "Imagine your
brain as the executive branch of a big business. It is divided as you can see
here into many departments. Seated at the big desk at the headquarters office is
the General Manager--your Conscious Self--with telephone lines running to all
departments."
Today it is easy to
ridicule such a simplistic view of how the brain works. We don't experience ourselves as a "General Manager"
issuing orders to members of a bureaucratic organization. Greeting a friend, for
instance, doesn't seem to have
anything in common with the process described in this fanciful diagram: 'Instantly
you begin issuing orders: 'Tell the Speech Manager to say "Hello Johnny!" Tell the Leg
Superintendent to stop walking at once! Tell the Arm Superintendent to stick
out my hand right away and take Jones's hand! Tell the Face and Lips
Superintendent to give this man a good big smile!'"
Rather, most of the
"orders" issued and received within the body must be unconscious ones,
since we are not aware of issuing them. Indeed, most of the operations of our
brain take place outside of our conscious awareness, and on the whole that isn't
such a bad thing. None of us would wish consciously to have to initiate every
action, no matter how petty, or to be aware of even the most trivial of
sensations.
But at the highest
levels of our mind's operations, during those less pressured, more
"philosophical" moments when we delve inward and explore the terrain
of our own minds, we tend to encounter and experience a "self," a
conscious controller who wills, remembers, decides to act, experiences emotions,
feels pain, and simultaneously rejoices and fears for the future. And at such
times we tend to subscribe to something similar to the General Manager in the
diagram. But when we try to pin
down this "self," this General Manager of the psyche, our experience
is like trying to ensnare a fish that has caught our eye by reaching into a
pellucid lake with our bare hands. We experience consciousness and awareness in
ourselves, but have no way of conveying these experiences to others. It's not
that we doubt--except in moments of intoxication, fever, or insanity--the
reality and existence of our inner self, our "mind." It's just that,
try as we might, we cannot pin it down in regard to its exact nature or
location.
For centuries, the
mind was treated as a mysterious, ethereal entity that could not be further
inquired about and the brain, the originator of all thought, was either ignored
altogether or treated as an inconvenient irrelevance. Such an attitude was at
least partly based, I am convinced, on a kind of "turf battle."
Traditionally, "why" questions (Why am I here?
Why is the world the way it is?) have been asked by philosophers, and until very
recently, few philosophers expressed any interest in learning about the brain.
As a result, many of the most interesting questions were approached in a false
and artificial way that turned off many people, myself included, who find
philosophical questions fascinating and challenging.
In my elementary
philosophy class, for instance, we spent hours debating whether a tree falling
in a forest empty of people made any noise. The solution to this conundrum comes
not from the use of syllogisms or other forms of reasoning, but from knowledge
about the human ear's connections to the brain along the auditory pathway from the
tympanic membrane to the medial geniculus in the midbrain, to the primary
auditory area in the temporal lobe, and finally to the auditory association
area, where the sound is recognized and identified. If the sound waves created
by the falling tree fail to strike a tympanic membrane,
or for some reason that message is not relayed onward to the brain, then no
sound exists; since sound, by definition, requires an ear and a brain. Absent
these, we have only waves of a certain frequency. Another much debated question
has to do with the reality of space and time independent of the mind. The
philosopher Immanuel Kant, who knew nothing about the brain, arrived intuitively
at the conclusion brain scientists would reach two hundred years later. In The
Critique of Pure Reason, published in 1781, he wrote that space and
time corresponded not to “objective" realities existing
independently of the mind (we would now say the brain) but are themselves
categories created by the mind. He claimed we can have no knowledge of
things as they are in themselves,
existing in a strictly independent physical sense. This is because
our senses construct our world for us and therefore do not present to the mind
external independent realities but only perceptions. In essence, our
"objective” world is a highly subjective one.
When I first
encountered Kant I found his ideas appealing, even though it would be another
decade before I confirmed that Kant was right when I encountered neurological
and psychiatric patients who suffered from disabilities affecting their
appreciation of space and time. Now, after twenty years studying the brain and
writing eight other books about
it, I think the time is right to explore some traditional philosophical
questions in the light of what we have learned about the brain over the past
several decades.
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Consciousness,
thought, memory, will, emotion - none of these has any independent outside
reality other than in the context of the human brain. All are based on the
brain's organization. This concept takes some getting used to at first. Few of us think of ourselves in terms of our brains.
If we think about the brain at all, it is usually in a way similar to the
way we think about the rest of our body. For instance, we may take up dietary
approaches aimed at increasing our alertness or mental efficiency.
To this extent the brain is just like every other organ composing the great
"machine," the human body. But few of us equate ourselves with our
brain. Yet a few moments spent with a person who has just suffered a
stroke illustrates in a stark and vivid manner one of nature’s aphorisms: Change
the brain, change the person. As a result of brain injury, the person is not the
same person as before. Insofar as we can
enter into the stroke victim's mental life - a task we will attempt at various
points throughout this book - we
encounter clear indications that perceptions, thoughts, and emotions are
drastically different than before the brain
injury. What's more, these differences are often unexpected, even bizarre. In
the pages that follow, for instance, we will encounter a man who
loses the ability to name animals but has no difficulty in naming inanimate
objects; another who can recognize tools but not musical instruments. Such
surprising impairments suggest that the brain is organized
differently than was believed by most experts in the past.
Who could have ever
imagined, for instance, that the concept of size could exist independently
within the brain, so that a person could lose the sense of whether an elephant
is bigger than a mouse but remain normal in every other way? None of these
strange and tragic impairments could have been predicted. Nor could we learn
what they teach us about the reality formed by us in our brain by simply sitting
around and thinking about them or
discussing them with others. Logical
analysis, reason, or the other methods favored by philosophers are little help
here. Only patients with these
impairments, many of them severely disabling and all of them tragic, can teach
us how our brain constructs our individual and collective "reality.”
Nature is the teacher, the patient “experiment,” and
the human brain the classroom.
The Modular
Brain describes recent
discoveries about brain organization and what that means for our ideas about the nature of
reality. Thus the book is in the tradition of exploring the "mind-body problem.”
But I prefer to think of it as finding and identifying the
General Manager depicted
in our 1930s diagram, if he exists, or permanently firing him
if he doesn't. Let's start with a quick overview of how we will proceed.
History
provides three revolutionary insights into the relationship of the brain and the mind.
The first
insight dates to the Greeks, specifically the physician and philosopher
Hippocrates, who wrote:
Not
only our
pleasure, our joy and our laughter but also our sorrow, pain, grief and tears arise from the brain, and the brain
alone. With it we think and
understand, see and hear, and we discriminate between the ugly and the
beautiful, between what is pleasant and what is unpleasant and between good and
evil.
With his
recognition of the brain as the seat of the mind, Hippocrates overthrew
thousands of years of speculation favoring other bodily organs. (The Egyptians
selected the liver; Aristotle held out for the heart, considering the brain
little more than a cooling system for the blood.)
Two thousand years
later, two early nineteenth-century European physicians, Paul Broca and Carl
Wernicke, conducted or supervised autopsies of patients who during their
lifetimes had suffered from aphasia, an impairment of their capacity to speak or
understand language. Broca and
Wernicke discovered areas of brain destruction in the left hemisphere of these
patients. From this came the second revolutionary insight. Broca and Wernicke
concluded that the left hemisphere mediated the production and understanding of
spoken language. But their findings
had a wider application than just language. In addition, they provided support
for the view that the brain is not a homogeneous structure in which one part is
equivalent to every other but, instead, is made up of special centers located at various locations in the two
hemispheres .
Following on the
discovery of the language centers came the discovery of the visual areas toward
the back, hearing along the sides, and movement and sensation toward the front.
Over the ensuing 120 years, neurologists and others have established additional
correlations between structure and function.
The third
revolution in our understanding of the brain extends back not more than a few decades, with much of the important work no more
than a few years old. It evolved from the view that the brain is organized
according to a hierarchical structure wherein the cerebral hemispheres, the
most recent and highly evolved areas of the brain control those more ancient
areas inherited pretty much unchanged from our evolutionary ancestors. While
this view is still useful in its way, it ignores recent evidence that even such a seemingly straightforward
function as vision is not at all a unitary process but involves separate parallel
processes that working together, result in our visual experience.
The Modular
Brain presents this new way
of thinking about our mind and its relationship to our brain. It is organized
into three sections.
First, we will
examine what has been thought over the centuries and until
very recently about the relationship of mind and brain. When we compare what we
know about the brain now with the thoughts held by our
predecessors, it's easy to become smug and assume we will soon learn everything
there is to know about it. But that smugness soon disappears when we discover
that although we have learned more about the brain in the last one hundred years than in all previously recorded history,
we remain woefully ignorant of the bases for most of the operations of the
brain. Moreover, as with physics after the introduction of quantum mechanics,
neuroscience has still to come up with a unified theory that incorporates new
discoveries about perception, thought, memory, and other brain processes. Sixty
years ago, the Nobel prizewinning neuroanatomist Santiago Ramon y Cajal wrote:
"In truth it is not possible, in our present state of knowledge, to
formulate a definitive theory of
the functional plan of the brain." If we emphasize the
word definitive, then Cajal's sentence is as true today as the day he
wrote it. But we have learned a lot in the intervening sixty years and can
now offer some intriguing ideas about how our brain works.
In the second part,
we will explore research leading up to this new truly revolutionary view of the
brain's operation, modular theory. Briefly, this theory holds that our
experience is not a matter of combining at one master site within the brain all
of separate components into one central perception. As strange as it may sound,
there is no master site, no
center of convergence. For centuries we thought there had to be. Descartes and
other philosophers referred to the brain's central coordinating area as a
"homunculus," a personified character much like the General Manager, a
kind of ghostlike figure later satirized by philosopher
Gilbert Ryle as "the ghost in the machine." Ryle's point in referring to a ghost was, of course, that there is no evidence for such a central
autonomous overseer within the brain. Besides, if such a creature
existed, who would be monitoring him or her (or it)?
Wherever
one looks in the brain - particularly the cerebral cortex, the
overarching expansion of the brain that in size, complexity, and cell number
differentiates us from all other living things - all brain cells and collections
of brain cells communicate with other cells. This means that no
"pontifical" cell or area holds sway over all others, nor do all areas
of the brain "report" to an overall supervisory center. Thus, to
betray my position at this early point in the game, the General Manager is a
fictional character. And like all fictional characters he was created in order
to fill a need within a story, in this case the early efforts to come up with a
theory of how the brain works. But with a change in the plot, the characters too
must yield place to different characters.
A theory based
on multiple connections all operating simultaneously and in parallel has
profound implications. "It implies that there is no cortical
terminus, no final destination where the soul or consciousness, for example, may
reside," according to Semir Zeki, a neuroscientist who has played a leading
role in the research establishing the modular theory of brain organization.
Finally, we will
explore what a modular organization of the brain means for our understanding of
the human mind. If no "final terminus" or center exists within the
brain, then who is this "me" encountered in moments of introspection?
Most of us certainly don't inwardly experience ourselves as modular, but as
singular and reasonably unified. Yet, as we shall see, important select aspects
of ourselves may be altered or disappear altogether on the basis of damage to
our brain (in other instances, of brain maldevelopment, they may never have
evolved in the first place). If I am the result of the operation of a vast
network of nerve cell interconnections, in which one cell may be influencing the
response of any of the other 40
to 50 billion other cells, then what attitude should I take to my inner perception that I remain basically the
same person throughout my life? What of free will? Philosophers have talked and
debated for centuries about the unity of the personality, the nature of emotion,
autonomy, and creativity. If you want to see how much they have accomplished and
how little they agree about any of these terms, open a philosophy textbook. Not
only is there no agreement, but many of the authors of these works seem to take
a perverse pride in compiling long lists of what each separate philosopher
thought and taught about even such seemingly elementary mental processes as
perception. One reason for this smorgasbord approach to the mind is
that--contrary to what most philosophers have written--perceiving and knowing
are not separate processes, with one following the other like a bucket of water
passed from hand to hand along a chain of firefighters, but one process. Vision,
for instance, is not at all like a camera where the eye focuses light on the
retina where a "picture" is taken and conveyed along the visual
pathways to the brain for interpretation. Rather, the brain actively constructs
what we "see," and we are at once camera, film, photographer, and picture. Just as no two
pictures are ever exactly the same because of differences in one or the other of these elements, so too our brain, thanks to its modular
organization, creates for each of us a unique "world picture."
In the pages that
follow, we will explore the implications of modular theory for our ideas about
memory, consciousness, free will, and personal identity. Modular theory helps us
to set to rest many old puzzles and conundrums, but in the process creates some
new and unique ones. To mention just one, artistic creativity involves some
brain areas more than others; these areas also seem to be more developed in
people proficient in the arts. Does this mean that artistic creativity is
primarily an inherited trait, and
that those with the "wrong" genes cannot hope to be
artistically creative? Everyday observation seems to contradict that claim: Many artists have come from families with unremarkable artistic abilities.
Yet artistic creativity of some artists at the highest levels seems to involve
mental abilities (perfect pitch, writing and "listening" to musical
compositions in one's head) that involve more than simple refinements on
commonly encountered musical talents. Ravel was such an
artist. His diaries describe his creative process and how that process broke
down as a result of brain damage. Recent experiments employing PET
scan studies of musicians have shed additional light on Ravel's creativity
and modular brain mechanisms.
It is my hope that The
Modular Brain will inspire general readers to consider the implications of
this new theory.
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